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Next generation cyber-physical systems (CPS) are expected
to be deployed in domains which require scalability as well
as performance under dynamic conditions. This scale and
dynamicity will require that CPS communication networks
be programmatic (i.e., not requiring manual intervention at
any stage), but still maintain iron-clad safety guarantees.
Software-dened networking standards like OpenFlow pro-
vide a means for scalably building tailor-made network ar-
chitectures, but there is no guarantee that these systems are
safe, correct, or secure.
In this work we propose a methodology and accompanying
tools for specifying and modeling distributed systems such
that existing formal verication techniques can be trans-
parently used to analyze critical requirements and proper-
ties prior to system implementation. We demonstrate this
methodology by iteratively modeling and verifying an Open-
Flow learning switch network with respect to network cor-
rectness, network convergence, and mobility-related proper-
ties.
We posit that a design strategy based on the complemen-
tary pairing of software-dened networking and formal ver-
ication would enable the CPS community to build next-
generation systems without sacricing the safety and relia-
bility that these systems must deliver.
1. INTRODUCTION
As the capabilities of modern computer technology con-
tinue to improve, an increasing number of safety-critical
tasks are integrated with or replaced by automatic control
and sensing systems (e.g. self-driving cars, unmanned aerial
vehicles, mobile sensor platforms, smart-grid technologies,
GPS navigation systems, etc.). These systems are frequently
distributed and often must be either large-scale or require
elasticity of scale as utilization or population uctuates.
Furthermore, many of these cyber-physical systems must in-
teroperate over very large collections of interacting devices
(possibly federated and running under multiple authorities),
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and they must be robust enough to handle churn, mobility,
and other potentially unstable or unpredictable conditions.
In order to operate under these conditions, CPSs will in-
evitably need to rely on increasingly more sophisticated data
and control networks while maintaining strong safety and re-
liability guarantees. These requirements suggest that CPS
communication networks be both programmatic (i.e., not re-
quiring manual intervention at any stage) [25] and exible
to changing operating conditions.
Let us consider communication networks which must link
multiple mobile end-hosts which communicate intermittently
but reliably. On a small scale these networks can be easily
built using multiplexed wireless communication like 802.11
or 802.15.4 Zigbee routers. As scale increases and end-
host mobility may span multiple routers or access points,
however, signicant overhead may be imposed by a naive
attempt to maintain an updated, consistent network state
tracking end-host locations. This complexity may be com-
pounded by the need to maintain QoS guarantees with re-
spect to delay, loss rate, power consumption, etc. Ideally,
any such communication network for next-generation cyber-
physical systems would use existing physical infrastructure,
but leverage domain-specic network designs and protocols
to maximize these guarantees.
Recent advances in software-dened networking, speci-
cally the OpenFlow initiative, allow precisely this exibility
in both physical infrastructure and software [23]. OpenFlow
routing hardware is supported by a number of major equip-
ment vendors, often requiring only a rmware upgrade to ex-
isting, deployed routers [2]. Compliant switches route data-
plane packets based on ow rules (next-hop rules which trig-
ger based on packet header) installed by a logically central-
ized controller. The controller is a domain-specic software
application which processes unknown or unhandled packets
sent by switches, and in response installs ow-rules in one
or more switches. It may run on one or more standard com-
putational resources, from commodity hardware to custom
FPGAs. OpenFlow has been used to implement a wide vari-
ety of network tools and protocols, including routing circuit-
switch and packet-switched trac over the same switch [10],
wave-length path control in optical networks [21], in-network
load balancers [26], wireless sensor networks [22] and wire-
less mesh networks [11].
While OpenFlow provides a powerful means for specify-
ing control-plane logic and protocols, the resulting networks
may not satisfy necessary safety conditions and QoS guar-
antees. In addition, controllers may contain not only im-
plementation errors, but also critical design and logic aws
arising from insucient or incorrect domain knowledge on
the part of the designer, unexpected concurrency issues, mis-
placed assumptions about the operating environment, etc.
These aws could be extremely damaging if not detected
before system deployment, especially in applications like ve-
hicular control networks.
Fortunately, existing formal analysis and verication tools,
applied to a model of the proposed system design, can be
used to determine in a semi-automated manner that dis-
tributed systems built using OpenFlow do enforce their re-
quirements in all cases. However, these tools are often lim-
ited to checking only properties in a small set of formal logics
(LTL, relational calculus, process calculi, etc.). Real-world
systems often have requirements spanning many such logics,
all of which must be veried using dierent formalisms.
In this work, we present an infrastructure and associ-
ated tools for specifying and analyzing real-world, formally
disparate properties of distributed systems, without requir-
ing prior knowledge of any formal logics or languages. We
provide an example using an OpenFlow -based network of
learning switches to allow communication between mobile
end-hosts. We investigate safety, stability, and probabilistic
reliability properties, and use the result to iteratively de-
sign the system model until it veriably satises all design
requirements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the OpenFlow standard in more detail and dis-
cusses how communication systems controlled using Open-
Flow programs may suer from design or logical errors. Sec-
tion 3 describes how these errors can be detected and xed
by analyzing formally specied properties of a model of the
communication system prior to implementation. Section 4
describes an infrastructure for modeling distributed systems
and automatically specifying and analyzing their properties.
Section 5 describes related work, and Section 6 concludes.
2. OpenFlow
OpenFlow [23] is an emerging routing standard for software-
dened networking that enforces a clean separation of the
data and control planes. An OpenFlow switch routes data
plane packets based on ow tables: ordered lists of rules
guarded by a pattern to be matched over a packet header.
These rules are installed by a controller, which is connected
to each switch via a secure, dedicated link. Rules, at a min-
imum, can specify a port to route over, packet dropping,
and forwarding of packets to the controller. If an incoming
network packet's header does not match any ow rule, it is
forwarded to the controller. Rules may also be set to expire
after some time or duration, and be used to gather simple
network statistics.
The OpenFlow controller is a software program running
on a machine connected to each switch by a secure, ded-
icated control plane. The controller handles packets sent
to it by OpenFlow switches and installs ow rules in the
switches' ow tables. The functionality of the controller is
determined completely by the application that it is being
used to implement, but all controller programs must com-
municate with switches only by installing ow rules. Con-
trollers can be written in a number of languages designed
for the purpose. Popular choices include NOX/POX [16],
Beacon [14], or Maestro [8], in addition to those listed in [1].
An OpenFlow network provides a powerful, scalable in-
frastructure that can be used to tailor networks to specic
tasks. Furthermore, all network design and planning beyond
physical connectivity can be done in software, specically in
the design of the OpenFlow controller program. This allows
for signicantly richer network processing and routing func-
tionality, but also introduces the possibility that (like any
other software program) logical or design errors could lead
to unsafe or incorrect behavior.
While network programming bugs may be tolerated in
best-eort systems or those serving non-critical needs, many
cyber-physical systems need iron-clad guarantees that a net-
work routing mission-critical information will always (or with
very high probability) meet its safety and correctness re-
quirements. OpenFlow does not provide these guarantees,
and so is not in its present form suitable for scalable net-
work design in the cyber-physical realm. We propose that
Vericare, a tool for formally veriable distributed system
design, can be used to bridge this gap.
3. DESIGN VERIFICATION
Signicant prior work has been done on formal verica-
tion of software implementations [13]. Most of these tech-
niques rely on the existence of a specication which is by as-
sumption correct. The implemented software is then checked
against this specication using formal techniques: the cor-
rect behavior of software is dened to be behavior which
conforms to the software's specication, and bugs are de-
ned as behaviors diverging from the specication.
However, as specications (or languages for dening speci-
cations) become more complex, another kind of correctness
should be considered: how can a designer have condence
that the specication (or collection of specications in multi-
ple models) he denes is an accurate reection of his intuitive
and practical expectations regarding the correct behavior of
the software? In particular, we are interested in some con-
rmation, from the perspective of a specication's designer,
that the specication of a system correctly captures the be-
havior and requirements that the designer believes that it
possesses. This is non-trivial, as there is no a priori correct-
ness criterion against which a specication can be checked.
We address this issue by proposing that a specication
should be constructed from a collection of formally modeled
invariants, scenarios, and environments that are accompa-
nied by familiar descriptions that a designer will recognize
and understand within the context of the system's domain.
On the back end, each invariant, scenario, or environment
could potentially be represented in a distinct underlying
model or specication language that is appropriate for it.
For example, the specication for a distributed le system
which guarantees some level of availability, could be con-
structed from a set of intuitive properties describing high-
level notions of reliability that may individually map to mul-
tiple underlying specications governing network behavior,
data consistency, and data integrity.
We concentrate on the formal verication of distributed
system design in the form of Vericare, a tool which allows
specications to be modeled and formally veried against
properties chosen by the designer. This process is fast enough
to allow rapid prototyping via formal verication, which can
for example be used to iteratively model a specication as
counter-examples to correctness claims are found.
Using the Vericare tool, it is possible to leverage Open-
Flow 's scalability without sacricing condence in the re-
sulting system's safety and correctness. As an example ap-
Bind source address to source switch and port
if destination address is known:
install fowarding rule to egress port for destination
if destination address is unknown:
install forwarding rule to flood packets on all ports except source port
Figure 1: OpenFlow learning switch controller logic
plication, we will model a network of OpenFlow learning
switches, verify its key requirements, and demonstrate how
this process can be used for rapid, iterative development of
the specication.
3.1 A Learning Switch Network
A learning switch is one that forms a routing table by
binding the source address of network packets to the port on
which those packets arrived. A network of these switches can
be used to implement a communications network for mobile
nodes such as autonomous mobile robots, warehouse oor
sta, or mobile sensor platforms. As nodes move between
locations, they connect to the network on dierent ports
of dierent switches. These may, for example, be 802.11
wireless access points, 802.15.4 Zigbee routers, etc.
In order to ensure consistent network state, an OpenFlow
controller maintains a network-wide routing table which it
uses to install switch-specic packet forwarding rules. Open-
Flow switches forward packets that don't match any for-
warding rule to the switch, which records the packet's ori-
gin and installs a forwarding rule to describe its next hop
(either to a specic switch port, or ooding to all switch
ports but the origin). Specically, the OpenFlow controller
utilizes the logic in Figure 3.1 whenever it receives a packet
sent to it by a switch.
In a traditional learning switch, every incoming network
packet is sent to the controller, ensuring that the network
state is as up-to-date as the last packet arrival. This min-
imizes the number of forwarding rules in the switch at any
time, but can cause signicant latency as all packets are
forwarded to the controller for processing. In our exam-
ple application, more forwarding rules are used to minimize
the number of packets which must be sent to the controller
without impacting the consistency of the logical and physi-
cal network states. Other designs are certainly possible, and
in fact Vericare could be used to explore their tradeos in
detail.
Our example network has the topology shown in Figure
2. Every switch has a dedicated channel to the OpenFlow
controller, a bidirectional link to another switch, and four
ports available for nodes to connect on. Nodes are mobile
end-hosts which connect to the network on a switch port for
some time, send and receive messages with other nodes, then
disconnect for some time before reconnecting elsewhere.
While the example network is small compared to most
real-world implementations, signicant empirical evidence
suggests that most violations of specied properties can be
detected using a small scale model [3]. This approach of
checking a scoped version of a model is standard in model-
checking and related verication paradigms. By necessity
the approach is not complete, so un-detected counterexam-
ples may exist. The approach is sound, however, guaran-
teeing that any counter-example to a property found by the
system will indeed violate that property.










Figure 2: Learning Switch Network Topology
1. no-forwarding-loops: Any packet that enters the net-
work will eventually exit the network
2. no-blackholes: Any packet that is sent will eventually
be received
3. stable-correct-receiver : If all nodes cease being mobile,
eventually all packets that are received will be received
by the intended recipient
4. stable-no-oods: If all nodes cease being mobile, even-
tually no more packets will be ooded
5. bounded-loss-rate: The expected packet loss rate of
mobile nodes is below a specied bound.
The rst two properties represent invariant safety and cor-
rectness requirements for the network: packets cannot be
routed in innite cycles or lost within the network. The
third and fourth properties represent network convergence
properties: once nodes remain stationary, the actual and
perceived (by the controller) locations of each node will cor-
rectly converge. The nal property represents a probabilistic
expectation about loss rate in the face of node mobility. Note
that we could also reason about the probability of specic
loss rates (i.e. that the loss rate is below a specied bound
with some probability) using the same formalisms discussed
below.
3.2 Formalizing Requirements
In order to verify the properties expressed above, it is
necessary to represent them as formulas in a formal logic
that makes it possible to automatically and provably solve
them over the domain of the model. Specically, in order to
specify correct behavior of systems (or any set of dened al-
gorithms), it is rst necessary to dene a collection of math-
ematical objects M that corresponds to the set of possible
systems S, as well as a mapping f : S !M from individual
systems s 2 S to objects m 2 M. It is then necessary to
establish some formal logical system F , or formalism, that
is suciently rich to express properties of objects in S. To-
gether (f;S;F) form one model space of the set of systems.
Given (f;S;F), it is possible to formally state what it
means for a system to satisfy a property: a system s 2 S
satises some property i it can be proven (either analyti-
cally or using a brute-force state space search) in the chosen
formalism F that f(s) 2 M satises a logical formula '
expressed in that formalism:
s satises requirement '() '(f(s)) 2 F
However, adopting only one set of objects M and one for-
malism governingM that is suciently powerful to express
all possible protocol properties is usually impractical. If
some object f(s) 2M captured all possible aspects of a sys-
tem s 2 S, determining whether that object satises some
property may be intractable or undecidable.
A more tractable approach is to choose several dier-
ent model spaces (f1;M1;F1); :::; (fk;Mk;Fk) for systems,
such that each model space can capture only some of the
relevant properties of a system, and such that there exists
a tractable or ecient algorithm for checking each property
in its corresponding formalism.
In this work we consider two formalisms for describing
properties of modeled systems: Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
and Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL*) [5]. PCTL*
formulas are logical statements governing probabilistic au-
tomata like discrete and continuous-time Markov chains; fur-
thermore, these logical statements can contain probabilistic
quantiers. Assuming that there exists a mapping that can
faithfully convert a protocol denition into a corresponding
probabilistic automaton, it is then possible to construct a
logical formula stating that the automaton (and thus, the
protocol) satisfy, e.g., a certain expected packet loss rate.
LTL is a particular subset of PCTL*; LTL formulas are
capable of expressing temporal properties about the exis-
tence of a state or set of states on the model which are of
interest. For example, if there is a mapping that can faith-
fully convert a protocol denition into a B uchi automaton,
then we can construct a logical formula stating that the au-
tomaton satises a property that will eventually (in some
future state) always be true (over all states following it).
The rst four properties dened above, no-forwarding-
loops, no-blackholes, stable-correct-receiver, and stable-no-
oods, are expressible as LTL formulas over a predicate
which is true if and only if the corresponding model state
is enabled. The nal property, bounded-loss-rate, can be
expressed in PCTL* using probabilistic quantiers over the
stationary distribution of the model represented as a Continuous-
Time Markov Chain (CTMC).
We should note that in practice, checking that a given
model of a system satises one or more properties usually
amounts to an exhaustive search of a pruned state space.
Individual states represent snapshots of the model in oper-
ation, and transitions represent valid ways in which a state
can progress. Such an approach to checking properties is
employed in other application domains, such as hardware
processor design [6].
4. VERIFICARE
In this section, we describe how the critical requirements
(described above) for a network of learning switches can be
formally veried under multiple calculi using the Vericare
tool. A key design principle of Vericare is rapid prototyp-
ing of a distributed system specication prior to its imple-
mentation. Specications to be analyzed are written in the
Vericare Modeling Language (VML). We rst model an ini-
tial, naive version of the learning switch network in VML.
We then describe how the properties to be veried are added
to the model, and iteratively analyze and update the model
until all necessary properties veriably hold.
4.1 VML
Before modeling the network of learning switches, it is
necessary to briey introduce the Vericare Modeling Lan-
guage, VML. VML is a specication modeling language in-
spired by Promela [17], Alloy [18], and Python. It is designed
to capture sketches of specications of distributed systems,
and abstracts implementation details in order to analyze ar-
chitectural and design-specic properties.
send(int link=0, set<host> dest=self.links[0], msgtype(a,b,...))
recv(link=all, msgtype(var1, var2,...), mfields='m')
Figure 3: VML send and receive primitives
VML supports typed sequences, sets, and dictionaries in
addition to integers and boolean values. In addition to ba-
sic indexing, insertion, and removal from these datastruc-
tures, VML allows simple containment checks, mapping of
VML statements over sequences and sets, and comprehen-
sions over sets. A non-deterministic pick primitive is also
provided for sets, which allows a comprehension whose max-
imum size is bounded by the user. These features allow
simple declarative reasoning about systems abstracted from
implementation details, as will be seen in the learning switch
model.
In order to permit formal analysis of concurrency-related
properties, control structures in VML are based on Dijk-
stra's Guarded Command Language [12]. VML supports if
and do structures, each of which consists of a sequence of
predicates guarding execution of a sequence of VML state-
ments. If at any point multiple guards are true, the selection
of which code block to execute is made non-deterministically.
4.1.1 The Network Abstraction
In addition to the features described above, VML provides
a congurable network abstraction to simplify the model-
ing of distributed systems. Under this abstraction, a VML
model consists of uniquely identied, independent, concur-
rent hosts communicating over a network. Each host has its
own internal variable scope, state, and control logic.
Each host has a sequence, links, of sets of hosts, which
denotes one or more links to the network over which some
subset of other hosts are reachable. Messages sent over links
are user-dened tuples prexed with a message type.
Message sending is provided via the built-in send primi-
tive in Figure 4.1.1, which sends a message to a (possibly
empty) set of hosts over a specied link. If a host is not
reachable over the specied link, it will not receive the mes-
sage. The dest parameter may be any expression which
evaluates to a set of hosts, such as a set comprehension.
This allows simple reasoning about unicast (single hosts),
multicast (set comprehensions) and broadcast (all hosts on
the link) communication without needing separate imple-
mentations of each message-passing paradigm. If left empty,
send's link and dest parameters default to a host's rst link
and all hosts reachable via that link, respectively.
Messages are received using the recv primitive in Fig-
ure 4.1.1, which receives messages over one or more links.
If messages are waiting on multiple links, the selection is
made non-deterministically. By default, recv receives mes-
sages over all inks. The message type parameter imposes
a criterion that only a message of type msgtype will be re-
ceived; other messages waiting in the receiver will not trigger
this statement.
The message must have as many tuple elements, with each
of a matching type, as variables specied in the recv state-
ment. After execution, each specied variable will contain
the value of that message tuple eld. Variables may be sin-
gletons, sets, or sequences. In the case of sequences, the
length of the receiving sequence must be at least equal to




4 recv(msg(saddr, daddr, sp)):
5 all {switch | switch in routes.keys()}:
6 if:
7 (switch == m.src): #Bind source addr to source port
8 routes[switch][saddr]=sp
9 (switch != m.src): #Bind source addr to source switch
10 routes[switch][saddr]=routes[switch][m.src]
11 ?(!(daddr in routes[m.src].keys())): routes[m.src][daddr]=-1
12 send(dest=sw_id, forwarding_rule(sp, saddr, daddr,
routes[switch][daddr])
13 send(dest=sw_iditch, msg(saddr, daddr))
Figure 4: Naive model of the learning switch con-
troller
tional mfields parameter provides a string to use as a prex
when accessing implicit message variables (such as the link
a message arrived over).
4.2 A Learning Switch Network in VML
Recall that an Openow network consists of three compo-
nents: the controller, network switches which route packets
based on ow tables, and end-hosts which send and receive
packets. Our initial modeling attempt will specify a net-
work of switches with ow tables, mobile end-hosts, and a
controller with a standard learning switch functionality.
The learning switch network relies on bi-directional con-
nections between ports, of which switches have several and
end-hosts have one. This can easily be represented in the
network abstraction by making each element of a host's
links sequence correspond to a single port, restricting the
size of the corresponding set of hosts per link to one, and
ensuring mutual inclusion in two connected hosts' links se-
quences. Section 4.2.3, which models mobile end hosts, cov-
ers the process in detail. Similar syntax is used to set up
the static topology shown in Figure 2 as the network's initial
state.
4.2.1 The Openflow Controller
The naive VMLmodel of an Openow learning switch con-
troller is presented in Figure 4. The routes datastructure
provides a mapping of (switch id; destination address) !
port, and allows the controller to look up the egress port
from a switch to a destination address.
The remaining VML code is the controller's event han-
dling loop. In lines 5-10, the controller updates its knowl-
edge of the origin's current switch and port. The route is
set to the source port in the case of the originating switch,
or to the originating switch in the case of other switches.
In lines 11-13, the controller checks the message destina-
tion against its network state. If the destination has been
seen before, it instructs the switch to install the appropriate
forwarding rule, which maps a network address to a port.
If the destination has not been seen before, it sets the des-
tination port to -1, which is interpreted by the switch as a
ood. It then re-sends the packet to the querying switch for
re-transmission.
4.2.2 The Openflow Switch
Openow switches have no intelligence beyond the ability
to match packet header elds against a table of forwarding
rules and to contact the controller if a packet does not match
any rule. For the purposes of this application, we modeled
these forwarding rules as tuples of (source port, sender ad-
dress, destination address). This ensures that a packet will
1 host opf_Switch():
2 seq<pair<(int, int, int)><int>> flow_table
3 int match=-2
4 int saddr, daddr, p
5 loop true:
6 if:
7 (len(self.links[0]) == 0):
8 if:
9 recv(msg(saddr, daddr)):
10 for rule in flow_table:
11 if:






18 (match > -1]):
19 send(link=match, msg(saddr, daddr))
20 (match ==-1):
21 all {port | port in self.links &&
port != 0 && len(links[port])}:
22 send(link=port, msg(saddr, daddr))
23 else:
24 send(link=0, msg(saddr, daddr, m.link))
25 else: skip
26 else:
27 recv(link=0, msg(sp, saddr, daddr)):
28 for rule in flow_table:
29 if:
30 ((sp, saddr, daddr)==rule.first):
31 match=rule.second
32 break
33 send(link=match, msg(saddr, daddr))
34 recv(link=0, forwarding_rule(sp, saddr, daddr, dp)):
35 flow_table.insert(0, pair((sp, saddr, daddr), dp))
Figure 5: VML model of an Openow switch
be sent to the controller when the destination is unknown, or
when the sender's current location (i.e. the specic binding
of switch, source address, and port) is not already known
to the controller. Responses from the controller are a for-
warding rule that either species an output port or a ood
instruction. Figure 5 presents the VML model of an Open-
ow switch.
Lines 8-25 model normal packet routing. The Openow
standards do not, to the authors' knowledge, explicitly state
that packets arriving from the controller should be dealt
with prior to packets arriving over normal links. We mod-
eled it as such since the alternative allows, for example, in-
denite delays on the installation of forwarding rules. The
ow table is modeled as a sequence of tuples mapping to
switch egress ports. This is an ordered ranking, which uses
the for operator to iterate over the sequence by index or-
der. The rst rule which matches the packet's header tuple
is triggered.
Lines 26-35 handle messages received from the controller.
These are either forwarding rules, or forwarded packets that
are re-sent after the installation of a forwarding rule.
4.2.3 The End-Host
End hosts are modeled as hosts that send and receive mes-
sages while connected to the network. Mobility is formal-
ized by the ability to non-deterministically disconnect and
to later re-connect on any open port. The end host VML
model is presented in Figure 6.
Lines 7-11 handle message reception and sending. Lines
12-21 handle disconnection and re-connection, which con-
sists of out-of-band adjustments to the network abstraction
and a global open_ports dictionary tracking available ports.
The semantics of the send function ensure that adding or
removing an identier to an element of a host's links se-
quence enables or disables the ability to send to that host.
During the connection procedure, an end-host adds itself to
the switch's link in order to receive messages, and adds the








8 recv(msg(saddr, daddr)): drop
9 true:







17 switch = pick 1 {s | s in open_ports.keys() &&
len(open_ports[s])}




Figure 6: VML model of a mobile end-host
4.3 Specifying and Verifying Properties
In Vericare, properties to be formally veried are usually
selected from a domain-specic library and not developed
by the system designer. As distributed systems often cover
multiple domains of expertise, it is unreasonable to assume
that all systems designers will be well-versed in both the
subtleties of relevant domains and the formal expression of
those domains' traits. Furthermore, many critical properties
(such as network connectivity, black-holes, etc) are shared
over many systems in the same domain. These can be for-
malized once and re-used many times.
Properties are stored in libraries in two forms: as a high-
level English-language statement, and as low-level formulas
capturing that statement in one or more logics. While logical
formulas are themselves general, the predicates and atoms
used in a formula must be instantiated on a per-model ba-
sis. Network-related properties that consist entirely of state-
ments about the state of the network abstraction and mes-
sages traversing it can be instantiated automatically. Others
must be manually instantiated, with user-dened predicates
to test relevant states and variables to bind as atoms.
The network safety properties no-blackholes and no-forwarding-
loops can both be automatically instantiated, as they per-
tain only to the state of the network. The network conver-
gence properties stable-no-oods and stable-correct-receiver
primarily requires the user to label the relevant guarded code
blocks and dene a predicate to check node id and destina-
tion address, respectively.
The network reliability property bounded-loss-rate requires
the user to provide additional information, as explained in
Section 4.4.2.
Once properties are selected and instantiated, the VML
model is translated to one or more back-end verication en-
gines using standard compiler implementation techniques
[4]. These can range from single algorithms (e.g. non-
interference checking) to o-the-shelf tools like Spin [17],
Alloy [18], PRISM [20], and ProVerif [7]; the only require-
ment is that a VML translator for the tool has been written.1
Only properties that are checkable under that engine's for-
malism will be compiled along with the model. This may
impose an order over properties to be checked, which must
be specied by the user. Packet loss ratios due to mobil-
ity, for example, should only be checked once it has been
1Translators for Spin and PRISM are in development. Oth-















Figure 7: Modeled Network Topology
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Figure 8: Forwarding Loop Network Routing State
established that packets will not be lost when nodes are sta-
tionary.
4.4 Model Analysis
In this section, we analyze the naive model of a learning
switch network with respect to the network safety and relia-
bility properties dened above. The network safety proper-
ties are veried using the Spin model checker, which checks
properties expressible in LTL (or more generally, any !-
regular property) via state-space search over a B uchi au-
tomaton.
The network reliability properties are analyzed using PRISM,
which performs probabilistic analysis of the system (modeled
as a Continuous-Time Markov Chain) using user-specied
transition rates.
4.4.1 Network Safety and Convergence
The no-blackholes, no-forwarding-loops, stable-no-oods and
stable-correct receiver properties were veried by translating
the VML model to Promela, the modeling language used by
the Spin model checker. Spin found a counter-example to the
no-forwarding-loop property based on the naive controllers'
mechanism for updating its routing table. In the following
example, nodes are prexed with an N and switches with an
S. Tuples denote a message send from the rst address to
the second. The initial network state is as depicted in Figure
7. While the complete verication trace is show in Figure
9too long to reproduce below, relevant steps in the counter-
example trace are as follows: The nal routing state is shown
in Figure 8. The controller has bound N0 to port 2 of S1,
which has resulted in ow rules that bind N0 to port 1 on S0
and port 2 on S1. These rules will bounce a message for N0
back and forth indenitely. Note that this is also a violation
of the no-blackholes property, as the message will never be
received by the destination on port 3 of S0. The root of
the problem is in using a naive learning switch controller to
manage multiple switches. Ports are expected to originate
only trac directly from nodes, not trac forwarded from
other switches. We introduced a new datastructure in the
controller, end_host_ports, to track this distinction. The
relevant portion of the modied controller is shown in Fig-
ure 10, in which a containment check within the sending
switch's set of node ports is used as a guard over the route
updating procedure.
After modifying the model to account for end-host ports,
re-verication nds no counter-examples to network safety
properties. A counter-example to stable-no-oods is found,
however. Since rules never expire in the current model, a
1. N0 sends (N0, N1).
2. S0 gets (N0, N1) on port 3, sends it to the controller.
3. The controller binds N0 to port 3 on S0.
4. The controller instructs S0 to ood the message.
5. S0 sends (N0, N1) to port 1.
6. S1 gets (N0,N1) on port 2, sends it to the controller.
7. The controller binds N0 to port 2 on S1.
8. N1 sends (N1, N0).
9. S0 gets (N1, N0) on port 4, sends it to the controller.
10. The controller installs (N0 ! 1) on S0.
11. The controller re-sends the packet.
12. S0 gets (N1,N0) from the controller, forwards it to port 1.
13. S1 gets (N1, N0) on port 2 sends it to the controller.
14. The controller installs (N0 ! 2) on S1.
15. S0 gets (N1, N0) from port 1,forwards it to port 1.
16. S1 gets (N1, N0) on port 2, forwards it to port 2.











Figure 10: Modied OpenFlow controller
ood rule once installed will never be updated. Adding an
expiration time (modeled as a non-deterministic option to
expire) to ood rules and re-verifying the model now returns
no counter-examples to the checked properties.
4.4.2 Network Reliability
Once network safety and convergence properties are ver-
ied, it is possible to analyze network reliability and per-
formance with respect to average packet loss rates. Ver-
icare currently uses PRISM to analyze such properties,
as it can perform probabilistic analysis of Markovian pro-
cesses. In this case, the system will be represented as a
continuous-time Markov chain. Since transition rates are
used to probabilistically change state and time, the VML
translator requires guarded code blocks to be labeled with
transition rates by the user. If a guard is not labeled, it
is assumed to have a transition rate of 1. This allows the
user to choose to only label guards that are relevant to the
property under analysis.
For this example we chose to model packet loss rate only
as a factor of mobility (the rate at which nodes join and
leave) and send rate. Other potential factors could also be
considered with minimal changes to the model, such as the
rate at which forwarding rules expire, etc. The user would
only have to assign rates the the respective guarded code
blocks.
Given the structure of the VML model, mobility is mod-
eled as two rates: a leave rate which models the frequency of
disconnections, and a join rate which models the frequency
of re-connections. This can be thought of as the rate at
which nodes pass through service areas of access points and
the amount of time to associate with the next access point,
for example. The chart in Figure 11 uses a static join rate of
Figure 11: Packet Loss Rate
2, with leave and send rates as shown in the gure. In this
analysis Vericare utilizes PRISM's capability to perform
multiple verication runs using dierent parameter settings
and track the results.
5. RELATED AND FUTUREWORK
We are unaware of any work wholly comparable to Ver-
icare, but a number research communities intersect with
specic aspects of the tool and its use. In this section, we
compare relevant aspects of our work to work on provably
safe and veriable OpenFlow controllers, formal verication
systems, and related work in the eld of cyber-physical sys-
tems.
5.1 OpenFlow
In 2008, McKeown et al. proposed the OpenFlow stan-
dard in [23]. A signicant community in both industry and
academia has since grown around this standard, including a
number of researchers seeking to add provable or veriable
guarantees to OpenFlow controller programs.
Frenetic [15] is a declarative network programming lan-
guage designed to allow safe programming of OpenFlow con-
trollers. Frenetic provides a query abstraction that allows
provably safe composition of controller functions, as well as
modular controller design.
NICE [9] is a model checker specically designed for Open-
Flow controllers. It provides a library of common proper-
ties to be checked, and can analyze NOX [16] source code
directly. NICE integrates symbolic execution with model
checking to dramatically reduce the size of the state space to
be searched by identifying equivalences among packet types.
Reitblatt et al. provide several formally veried consistent
network update abstractions in [24]. The authors dene no-
tions of per-packet and per-ow consistency, both at a high
level and with respect to a mathematical network model
presented in the paper. They dene veriable notions of
trace invariants that allow model-checking of both notions
of consistency.
Flog [19] is a logic-programming language that allows Open-
Flow controller programs to be developed rapidly and in
only a few lines of code. Flog breaks controllers into a ow-
identication phase that species ows of interest, an infor-
mation processing phase based on exhaustive triggering of
inference rules, and a policy generation phase that generates
forwarding rules to be installed on one or more switches.
5.2 Formal Verification
A key strength of Vericare is in the integration of o-
the-shelf engines for formal verication of models. These
verication tools each have a modeling language, property
specication language, and formal system allowing auto-
matic checking of properties over the model. Each tool ex-
cels at checking those properties which are capable of being
expressed in its specication language.
The SPIN model checker [17] is designed to analyze con-
current processes communicating over channels. Models are
written in Promela, which is a C-like language supporting
non-determinism and providing a channel abstraction for
modeling of inter-process communication. Properties are
written in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) or as never-claims,
which are capable of expressing any !-regular property. Spin
translates the model and properties to B uchi automata,
which are synchronously composed. The automaton's state
space if then exhaustively searched for instances in which a
counter-example state is reachable.
Alloy [18] is a declarative modeling and specication lan-
guage based on rst-order logic, relational algebra, and set
theory. Models and properties to be checked are not distinct
in Alloy; properties are constraints over the space of model
instances. Verication is done by translation of a scoped
model to a Boolean formula, which is then passed to a SAT
solver for satisability testing.
PRISM [20] is a verication tool that analyzes models
written in a guarded-command language based on [12]. Mod-
els correspond to probabilistic automata. Properties to be
checked are written in Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic
(PCTL*), which includes probabilistic and temporal quan-
tiers. PRISM also supports reward-based property veri-
cation, in which states and transitions can be labeled with
rewards that are incremented whenever that state or transi-
tion is reached. PRISM has both model-checking (for quali-
tative) and numeric computation (for quantitative) libraries
that are used for verication of models.
ProVerif [7] is a tool for analyzing cryptographic security
properties of protocols. ProVerif models are represented as
Horn clauses and veried using logical resolution. Check-
able properties include reachability of dened states, obser-
vational equivalence of models, and correspondence proper-
ties.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we presented Vericare, a design and mod-
eling tool for distributed systems. Vericare allows for real-
world system properties from multiple domains to be veried
against a system model or countered with example execution
traces highlighting a property violation.
We also argued that Vericare can be used to bridge the
gap between software-dened networking and QoS, safety, or
reliability guarantees. This indicates a viable design method-
ology for the construction of scalable, veriable communica-
tion networks for cyber-physical systems. We provided an
example of this methodology in the form of an OpenFlow
learning switch network. The system was modeled in Veri-
care, and network safety, convergence, and reliability prop-
erties were analyzed. Counter-examples to these properties
were used to iteratively rene the system's design until all
requirements were satised.
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